Miniver Cheevy: The speech it's not too late for Obama to make: "It is far better for a people to claim democracy for themselves than to try to build it in the wake of another nation's intervention. We should know that, having created our own nation in rebellion against the greatest colonial power of its time.
Better for a people to claim democracy for themselves, and best for them to do so without raising a gun at all. There are those who will say that to stand up against an oppressor without shedding their blood is too idealistic. Despots' grip on power is too great, they say. Only military force can break their grip."
Showing posts with label revolution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label revolution. Show all posts
Friday, February 11, 2011
Miniver Cheevy: The speech it's not too late for Obama to make
I loved this ungiven speech posted over at Miniver Cheevy. Hope you will too. Here's an excerpt:
Wednesday, October 01, 2008
Children of the Revolution at BBC World Service
Recommended listening: BBC World's Children of the Revolution
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Interview 3: Gary Sick talks about negotiating with Iran
This is a long post, but I learned so much from my interview with Gary Sick, and I am certain my readers will also be interested.
Gary Sick served on the National Security Council under three U.S. presidents: Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide on Iran during the time of the Iranian Revolution.
I met Gary Sick for a couple of seconds when Kamran had an assignment to photograph him for an article about the “October Surprise.”(1)
We went to his New York apartment, photographed him outside, and left. He probably does not even remember, but I do.
Gary Sick was in the Carter administration during the taking of the American embassy by revolutionary Iranian students. His discussion of that time, the difficulty of the negotiations, and the analysis of steps, missteps, and surprises is compelling and concise. He was gracious enough to lend me some of his time for an interview. That interview is for the book I am writing about Iran.
With his permission, here are some excerpts from that interview. (All emphasis mine)
You were involved with Iran during a particularly confusing moment. Americans had been taken hostage in their embassy by revolutionary students, and no one was really sure who was in charge. How did this effect negotiations?
It was absolutely the centerpiece of our negotiation efforts. Iran was still in the revolutionary process. There was no real power center. Khomeini was certainly a power center, but he was in the shadows during the early days; his words were important, but he did not exert overt control. I think that was the way he wanted it at the time.
We had no one to negotiate with. We talked to various contacts we had, talked to various power centers, we just had to hope that we could get some word in. Eventually this worked, and we did make contact. We found Bani Sadr and Ghotbzadeh who were the president and the foreign minister at the time, but who turned out not to have any real power. We reached an agreement with them, but it was shut down by Khomeini who ultimately fired Bani Sadr.
Today it may be difficult to deal with Iran, but you know who the power centers are: negotiations have to start with Khamenei, of course, but take into account the majles [Parliament], the office of the presidency, Rafsanjani, and the bazaar, among others.
In Iran, most decisions are consensus decisions, made by a group of power centers.
Negotiating with dictatorships is easy. In dictatorships, you know exactly who to talk with and where the power is. In Iran this is not true at all. There are many power centers, and those power centers can be opaque. Iranians often use this to their advantage in negotiations.
...
What about the personal style of a negotiation?
Iranians seem to think they have an extra negotiation gene, a bargaining gene, one that is peculiar to Iran and a source of great pride. The Iranians I dealt with seem to think they can outwit, out-bargain anyone,
and they take great pride in this. This is another way that Americans and Iranians really differ. Americans do not grow up thinking their success or personal identity is determined by how well they bargain or that they can out-bargain or outwit anyone. It's just not part of our culture or our upbringing. It certainly is not a source of national pride.
As a result, Americans put into negotiations with Iranians are often at a disadvantage.
...
Iranians report that they feel that the West would like to trick them into agreements that end up making them feel cheated. Where do you think this feeling comes from? Do you have any ideas about what is needed to gain the trust of Iranians when negotiating?
The West did try to take advantage of Iran, there are no two ways about that. Look at the British oil deal, which gave an unfair advantage to the British and unfair terms to the Iranians. Look at the great powers kicking out the shah's father. Iranians earned their right to suspicion and paranoia.
That overall sense of grievance, prevalent in Iran and throughout the Middle East in general, that sense that Muslims are discriminated against,humiliated, badly regarded, again repeatedly humiliated in political terms: that grievance runs through the Middle East very strongly. These grievances are important to understanding the rise of political Islam. And it is not totally wrong. It is true that many of these countries have been victimized, but many also acknowledge they have assisted in that victimization. Their own governments have been terrible in promoting and protecting the self-interest of their citizens. They have failed at creating governments that can compete in the global marketplace of ideas. I meet people from the region all the time who desperately want to see better governance. They want better governance.
At least one of the factors that led to these humiliations is that they have been victimized by the rest of the world who portray them as backwards and incompetent and dangerous. This is an idea that they sometimes play into as well: Arabs and Iranians. An example of this is the discussion that occurred in the Arab world after 9/11. Arabs -- and I am talking about educated sources: magazine editors, intellectuals, professors -- claimed that Arabs could not carry out this type of operation. They argued that Arabs are completely inadequate to the task: it was just too complicated. Arabs were too incompetent and that is why the Mossad or CIA or some other organization had to have been responsible for 9/11. This was a serious argument We could not carry out something that big, many Arabs said.
The dilemma, which includes Iran, is that they are aware of their own shortcomings and how these shortcomings make them vulnerable, but they do not know how to address them.
....
When I was in Iran, most of the processes (both private & public) seemed paralyzed by a general fear/inability to make decisions. Is this also the case at the diplomatic level? Overall, how do you view the Iranian government's decision-making process? What kind of influence do the IR's negotiators have?
Iran is not a decisive culture. This is another contrast between Americans and Iranians. Americans, because of their move West and taking all these big decisions, well this has made it a decisive culture. Americans take big decisions and the responsibility for these decisions. Iranians do not have this same culture. And part of this is because the US history has been that we are rich and growing. Even if we make a mistake we can recover form it. You know what Churchill said, "The Americans always do the right thing...after trying all the other alternatives." Well, once we've tried everything else, we eventually find the right way.
We can make mistakes and get,away with it. In the US we believe that ultimately our strength will get us to a point where we can recover from anything, whether this is really still the case or not is unclear.
In Iran they have a sense that they are living a lot closer to the breaking point. Mistakes made can destroy their lives and even their country.
That does not mean that they do not make decisions. They do make decisions. For example, I believe that Iran has an actual nuclear policy. It's a real policy and they are pursuing it.
When the US decided that preemption was the new policy, the Bush administration immediately published a policy paper announcing preemption as a permanent addition to US national strategy. Iranians on the contrary do not announce their policies. They do not wave a banner and say "This is our policy, come and read it." They are more subtle and indirect.
One of the best descriptions I heard to describe this is that America is a football culture: it's all about confrontation and open head-to-head competition. 
Iran is more of a chess culture that proceeds with a subtlety of moves. They are always thinking three steps ahead, trying to make the opponent look foolish, trapping somebody so that they think you are doing one thing when you are really doing another.
This is a great source of misunderstanding between us. Iranians think that we do not mean what we say, that there must be something else behind our words. For out part, Ahmadinejad makes a statement and we think that statement is the policy.
...
Many people talk about taarof (The Iranian system of manners) and taqieh (a doctrine which permits Shia to lie in order to survive persecution) when they talk about dealing with Iranians. How important do you see these aspects of Iranian culture?
Elements. I don't think that Iran or even Muslims or Middle Easterners are the only people who lie or dissemble or pretend to do one thing when they want to do another. From what I understand about our current dealings with Iran: a lot of what we are doing is pretending to be bigger, stronger and more dangerous than we really are. That kind of dissembling is something we do as well. It's just something we don't do very well. Iran is also trying to make us believe that they are bigger and stronger than they actually are.
Iranians just have more experience and skill at dissembling than we do.
I do have this worry: because of their bargaining gene, Iranians always feel that they can get another 2 or 3 percent, so they always go for more. When they get an offer that meets 90% of their terms, they think that maybe they can get 93%. In the end this kind of negotiation means that they may lose the whole thing. Squeezing everything out of your opponent may backfire.
And it is not just Iran that does this. I've watched the US negotiate or not negotiate with Iran on the nuclear issue for the past 15 years. The kind of deal we could have gotten in 1990 or 91 would look so good to us now, but we wanted more.
We lost 50% of the game, yet we are still maintaining an all or nothing approach to the negotiations.
With regard to Iran...look at what they've done with foreign investment from oil companies. They need the foreign investment, but they squeezed so hard and drove such a hard bargain, that many companies said that it just is not worth it. Why should we do this? We've lost all of our profit margin in negotiations, we'll make ourselves unpopular with the US, who needs it? They walked away. Oil executives told me that the Iranians would negotiate vigorously and endlessly. Negotiate and negotiate and negotiate. When they thought that an agreement had been reached, it would start all over again. Finally Western companies said forget about it; it's just not worth it. They want to be there, but it is not possible. Iran is paying a very high price for this.
Iran has done great damage to its own interests by over negotiating.
There is some worry that the same is true with their nuclear policy with the whole inalienable right rhetoric. Insisting on the right to do something stupid, might not be best policy in the end. It seems that there are some in Iran who care more about the principle at stake than having a functioning nuclear program.
(1)
October Surprise refers to a controversial book that Gary Sick wrote after serving on the National Security Council under Ford, Carter, and Reagan. The book documents evidence of secret negotiations between the Reagan campaign and the revolutionary clerics in Iran that ultimately led to a nefarious arms deal involving the Nicaraguan contras, Israelis, and revolutionary clerics in Iran. It is not the only book or article that Sick has written about Iran, he is also the author of the influential All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran and many articles.
back to text
Gary Sick served on the National Security Council under three U.S. presidents: Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He was the principal White House aide on Iran during the time of the Iranian Revolution.
I met Gary Sick for a couple of seconds when Kamran had an assignment to photograph him for an article about the “October Surprise.”(1)
We went to his New York apartment, photographed him outside, and left. He probably does not even remember, but I do.
Gary Sick was in the Carter administration during the taking of the American embassy by revolutionary Iranian students. His discussion of that time, the difficulty of the negotiations, and the analysis of steps, missteps, and surprises is compelling and concise. He was gracious enough to lend me some of his time for an interview. That interview is for the book I am writing about Iran.
With his permission, here are some excerpts from that interview. (All emphasis mine)
You were involved with Iran during a particularly confusing moment. Americans had been taken hostage in their embassy by revolutionary students, and no one was really sure who was in charge. How did this effect negotiations?
It was absolutely the centerpiece of our negotiation efforts. Iran was still in the revolutionary process. There was no real power center. Khomeini was certainly a power center, but he was in the shadows during the early days; his words were important, but he did not exert overt control. I think that was the way he wanted it at the time.
We had no one to negotiate with. We talked to various contacts we had, talked to various power centers, we just had to hope that we could get some word in. Eventually this worked, and we did make contact. We found Bani Sadr and Ghotbzadeh who were the president and the foreign minister at the time, but who turned out not to have any real power. We reached an agreement with them, but it was shut down by Khomeini who ultimately fired Bani Sadr.
Today it may be difficult to deal with Iran, but you know who the power centers are: negotiations have to start with Khamenei, of course, but take into account the majles [Parliament], the office of the presidency, Rafsanjani, and the bazaar, among others.
In Iran, most decisions are consensus decisions, made by a group of power centers.
Negotiating with dictatorships is easy. In dictatorships, you know exactly who to talk with and where the power is. In Iran this is not true at all. There are many power centers, and those power centers can be opaque. Iranians often use this to their advantage in negotiations.
...
What about the personal style of a negotiation?
Iranians seem to think they have an extra negotiation gene, a bargaining gene, one that is peculiar to Iran and a source of great pride. The Iranians I dealt with seem to think they can outwit, out-bargain anyone,
and they take great pride in this. This is another way that Americans and Iranians really differ. Americans do not grow up thinking their success or personal identity is determined by how well they bargain or that they can out-bargain or outwit anyone. It's just not part of our culture or our upbringing. It certainly is not a source of national pride.
As a result, Americans put into negotiations with Iranians are often at a disadvantage.
...
Iranians report that they feel that the West would like to trick them into agreements that end up making them feel cheated. Where do you think this feeling comes from? Do you have any ideas about what is needed to gain the trust of Iranians when negotiating?
The West did try to take advantage of Iran, there are no two ways about that. Look at the British oil deal, which gave an unfair advantage to the British and unfair terms to the Iranians. Look at the great powers kicking out the shah's father. Iranians earned their right to suspicion and paranoia.
That overall sense of grievance, prevalent in Iran and throughout the Middle East in general, that sense that Muslims are discriminated against,humiliated, badly regarded, again repeatedly humiliated in political terms: that grievance runs through the Middle East very strongly. These grievances are important to understanding the rise of political Islam. And it is not totally wrong. It is true that many of these countries have been victimized, but many also acknowledge they have assisted in that victimization. Their own governments have been terrible in promoting and protecting the self-interest of their citizens. They have failed at creating governments that can compete in the global marketplace of ideas. I meet people from the region all the time who desperately want to see better governance. They want better governance.
At least one of the factors that led to these humiliations is that they have been victimized by the rest of the world who portray them as backwards and incompetent and dangerous. This is an idea that they sometimes play into as well: Arabs and Iranians. An example of this is the discussion that occurred in the Arab world after 9/11. Arabs -- and I am talking about educated sources: magazine editors, intellectuals, professors -- claimed that Arabs could not carry out this type of operation. They argued that Arabs are completely inadequate to the task: it was just too complicated. Arabs were too incompetent and that is why the Mossad or CIA or some other organization had to have been responsible for 9/11. This was a serious argument We could not carry out something that big, many Arabs said.
The dilemma, which includes Iran, is that they are aware of their own shortcomings and how these shortcomings make them vulnerable, but they do not know how to address them.
....
When I was in Iran, most of the processes (both private & public) seemed paralyzed by a general fear/inability to make decisions. Is this also the case at the diplomatic level? Overall, how do you view the Iranian government's decision-making process? What kind of influence do the IR's negotiators have?
Iran is not a decisive culture. This is another contrast between Americans and Iranians. Americans, because of their move West and taking all these big decisions, well this has made it a decisive culture. Americans take big decisions and the responsibility for these decisions. Iranians do not have this same culture. And part of this is because the US history has been that we are rich and growing. Even if we make a mistake we can recover form it. You know what Churchill said, "The Americans always do the right thing...after trying all the other alternatives." Well, once we've tried everything else, we eventually find the right way.
We can make mistakes and get,away with it. In the US we believe that ultimately our strength will get us to a point where we can recover from anything, whether this is really still the case or not is unclear.
In Iran they have a sense that they are living a lot closer to the breaking point. Mistakes made can destroy their lives and even their country.
That does not mean that they do not make decisions. They do make decisions. For example, I believe that Iran has an actual nuclear policy. It's a real policy and they are pursuing it.
When the US decided that preemption was the new policy, the Bush administration immediately published a policy paper announcing preemption as a permanent addition to US national strategy. Iranians on the contrary do not announce their policies. They do not wave a banner and say "This is our policy, come and read it." They are more subtle and indirect.
One of the best descriptions I heard to describe this is that America is a football culture: it's all about confrontation and open head-to-head competition. 
Iran is more of a chess culture that proceeds with a subtlety of moves. They are always thinking three steps ahead, trying to make the opponent look foolish, trapping somebody so that they think you are doing one thing when you are really doing another.This is a great source of misunderstanding between us. Iranians think that we do not mean what we say, that there must be something else behind our words. For out part, Ahmadinejad makes a statement and we think that statement is the policy.
...
Many people talk about taarof (The Iranian system of manners) and taqieh (a doctrine which permits Shia to lie in order to survive persecution) when they talk about dealing with Iranians. How important do you see these aspects of Iranian culture?
Elements. I don't think that Iran or even Muslims or Middle Easterners are the only people who lie or dissemble or pretend to do one thing when they want to do another. From what I understand about our current dealings with Iran: a lot of what we are doing is pretending to be bigger, stronger and more dangerous than we really are. That kind of dissembling is something we do as well. It's just something we don't do very well. Iran is also trying to make us believe that they are bigger and stronger than they actually are.
Iranians just have more experience and skill at dissembling than we do.
I do have this worry: because of their bargaining gene, Iranians always feel that they can get another 2 or 3 percent, so they always go for more. When they get an offer that meets 90% of their terms, they think that maybe they can get 93%. In the end this kind of negotiation means that they may lose the whole thing. Squeezing everything out of your opponent may backfire.
And it is not just Iran that does this. I've watched the US negotiate or not negotiate with Iran on the nuclear issue for the past 15 years. The kind of deal we could have gotten in 1990 or 91 would look so good to us now, but we wanted more.
We lost 50% of the game, yet we are still maintaining an all or nothing approach to the negotiations.
With regard to Iran...look at what they've done with foreign investment from oil companies. They need the foreign investment, but they squeezed so hard and drove such a hard bargain, that many companies said that it just is not worth it. Why should we do this? We've lost all of our profit margin in negotiations, we'll make ourselves unpopular with the US, who needs it? They walked away. Oil executives told me that the Iranians would negotiate vigorously and endlessly. Negotiate and negotiate and negotiate. When they thought that an agreement had been reached, it would start all over again. Finally Western companies said forget about it; it's just not worth it. They want to be there, but it is not possible. Iran is paying a very high price for this.
Iran has done great damage to its own interests by over negotiating.
There is some worry that the same is true with their nuclear policy with the whole inalienable right rhetoric. Insisting on the right to do something stupid, might not be best policy in the end. It seems that there are some in Iran who care more about the principle at stake than having a functioning nuclear program.
(1)
October Surprise refers to a controversial book that Gary Sick wrote after serving on the National Security Council under Ford, Carter, and Reagan. The book documents evidence of secret negotiations between the Reagan campaign and the revolutionary clerics in Iran that ultimately led to a nefarious arms deal involving the Nicaraguan contras, Israelis, and revolutionary clerics in Iran. It is not the only book or article that Sick has written about Iran, he is also the author of the influential All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran and many articles.
back to text
Thursday, July 26, 2007
Interview 1: Covering Iran's Revolution
...An interview with Marie...
This is the first in a series of interviews we are beginning. We are starting with Marie, a woman who has been commenting on this site for several years. Marie is an award-winning filmmaker, artist, and teacher who lived in Iran for over a year during the American hostage crisis. Her love affair with Iran did not end when she left the country but rather continued. She is currently expanding into the fields of acupuncture and herbal medicine and looks forward to fusing her knowledge of art and healing into effective and unexpected paradigms.
Marie, Your comments on our blog have intrigued us for years. You were in Iran during the revolution. Can you begin by telling us a) How much time you spent in Iran and b) Why you went there in the first place?
First, I was not there during most of the revolution. I arrived at the tail end, although I felt like I was there, as my husband at the time (Nader) was there and had used my photographic portfolio to get a job as a Time Magazine photographer and free ticket to Tehran.
I arrived in Tehran in September of 1979, and left December 22, 1980, so I was there between 15 and 16 months.
Nader had left for Iran in November the year before, and became very involved in the revolution there. He started a newspaper that year with some colleagues of his from CBS called Tehran Times, which is still being published, although he's no longer involved with it. I believe it became sort of a mouth piece of the government.
I came to be in Iran because Nader came to New York in the summer of 1979 and convinced me to go back with him. He secured jobs for us as stringers at NBC. In case you don't know, stringers are usually 1 or 2 man crews that work for the networks when news is light. He did camera, and I did sound. I went because a) the job b) Nader, whom I was in love with, but we had a complicated relationship c) I have always been intrigued by Iran d) I wanted to see the 'revolution' up close.
Unfortunately our job was short lived, as the hostages were taken the first week of November. The American Media poured in and I became radicalized :-)Seriously. I had always been somewhat delusional regarding our television networks, that while they don't show the whole thing, they made an effort to tell the news. What I learned very quickly was this was not true. I discovered that the story is decided prior to any fact finding. I quickly became disillusioned.
It was a very difficult year. Money was scarce. People were nervous. There was a lot of anarchy in the true sense of the word and there was a lot of hope. The hope really started to dissipate in the spring and summer of 1980. The mullahs consolidated power. I remember Bani Sadr giving history lessons on tv: how the Russian Revolution was hijacked by the Bolsheviks. It was so obvious what he was trying to tell people, but he was also complicit from the beginning. The mullahs had supported his presidential bid.
I will never forget the moment when I walked up the hill to television (where I worked) and heard that the 'sister' had to go home and change her clothes. I had been working there already for many months, and the guard was very embarrassed as he knew me and we were friendly. I was wearing a scarf, but now I needed a long shirt that covered my rear end. I stamped down the hill in absolute fury and for some reason felt terribly humiliated. It was very hot that day too. It was summer, probably in August that policy was implemented. All women who worked in government buildings had to observe hejab - dress code.
Wow, that was really interesting. I have so many questions to ask now. You bring up something interesting. We tend to think of the revolution in Iran as an Islamic one, but the reality is that there were many different factions (including Communists) involved in the overthrow of the Shah. So you were in Iran as the revolution was "Islamifying." In addition to the hejab, what would you say was the most striking example of the change from secular rule to Islamic rule?
It was not an Islamic revolution but it had an Islamic leader in the tradition of Iran; a charismatic leader and that was Khomeni. He was a magnetic personality and many gravitated toward him. But yes, the 'people' did not give up their power to the mullahs all at once. It was a consolidation of power in areas the previous government had ruled, such as television and the secret police, and required additionally the formation of the Revolutionary Guards and other supportive and intimidating structures. Mullahs executed a lot of people that year. I met and interviewed Judge Khalkhali, also known as Judge Blood. Quite an experience.
Shortly after I arrived in Tehran, a woman in a tight skirt was walking down the street. At the time, Iranian women ( in Tehran) sort of amazed me because they were either wearing the black chador or a floral chador wrapped around the body, or they were dressed like Italian women: skin tight jeans, very sexy etc. Very few women dressed in the rather asexual style in loose skirts or pants favored by Americans at the time. So this woman in her skin tight skirt was not that unusual. A man ran up and grabbed her skirt from the hem and ripped it straight up in protest. But from several directions, men converged upon him and sort of roughed him up and reprimanded him, and more people flocked to the woman and covered her with their coats. The crowd faced him off with indignation. He was an individual against a wall of disapproval for his extreme and insulting action.
At that time, people would socialize outside the walls, families would enjoy outings and music would play from cassette players with even a little dancing in the street. My impression was that Iranians like to have a good time. There was also happiness at the success and peacefulness of the revolution. Iranian soldiers had not massacred the people. By the time I left over a year later, that was over. The war had started and the squeeze was on. People had already left during the revolution, and another wave left in the fall of 1980. It was clear where the country was going.
Many different factions (including Communists) involved in the overthrow of the Shah...
Yes, the Tudeh Party were the communists. The Fedayeen were the leftists. And the Mujahadeen were the Islamic Leftists, if you want to call them that. I went to a Mujahadeen rally in the winter of 1979/1980. It ended in tear gas and guards opened machine gun fire into the crowds. It was utter chaos. People flattened to the ground in an instant to avoid getting shot.
In addition to the hejab, what would you say was the most striking example of the change from secular rule to Islamic rule?
Please understand that when I went to Iran, it was a time of flux. The shah was gone. I heard a great deal about what life was like under the shah but did not experience it first hand. Many people had already left, and many Jews were fleeing Iran when I arrived. Many people and intellectuals who had been banned and tortured under the shah had returned. For example Reza Baraheni, whom I met and interviewed, had returned. He eventually left again. There was hope for a period of time that Iran be a place that would accommodate free and intellectual thought, there was hope for real change, land distribution and rights for the peasants.
The change toward an Islamic state was creeping and gradual. But of course, like with Nazi Germany, the writing was on the wall. Khomeini made his intentions very clear. But people were really in love with him. He inspired loyalty to the extreme. Even people who were not religious.
If I had to say what the change was, it was in the growing presence of Revolutionary Guards. It was the way people who had started things, like the Tehran Times, eventually gave up and drifted away. 2 of the 5 founding members of that paper had left for France by the time I left. The war really changed things. There were long lines for bread, rice and sugar. Tehran was being attacked, and the nights were dominated by the terrifying sounds of anti-aircraft missiles and actual bombs. Every late afternoon the air raid sirens screamed, warning people to get home before dark. This was a good opportunity for the mullahs to really move in and dig deep.
You may find that things have changed in this country. There has been damage done to our constitution. This administration used the attacks from 9/11 to do some very insidious things. War is always useful for undermining any democratic process because fear is a great weapon for manipulating people.
What is the one thing that you miss most about Iran?
Before I answer, I want to point out to you that the biggest thing that happened in Iran since I left is that the population has tripled (or something like that).
I miss most its light and colors.
What are your favorite blogs/sites?
I read your blog and through yours have started reading SERENDIP. I read the CATO website sometimes. NPR, WNYC - Look at the Bush/Blair Love Duet, at http://www.atmo.se/zino.aspx?articleID=399 - it's very funny. I have too many interests, agricultural, apiary, avian and environmental... it gets overwhelming.
Thanks Marie... This was a great start to our interview series.
This is the first in a series of interviews we are beginning. We are starting with Marie, a woman who has been commenting on this site for several years. Marie is an award-winning filmmaker, artist, and teacher who lived in Iran for over a year during the American hostage crisis. Her love affair with Iran did not end when she left the country but rather continued. She is currently expanding into the fields of acupuncture and herbal medicine and looks forward to fusing her knowledge of art and healing into effective and unexpected paradigms.
Marie, Your comments on our blog have intrigued us for years. You were in Iran during the revolution. Can you begin by telling us a) How much time you spent in Iran and b) Why you went there in the first place?
First, I was not there during most of the revolution. I arrived at the tail end, although I felt like I was there, as my husband at the time (Nader) was there and had used my photographic portfolio to get a job as a Time Magazine photographer and free ticket to Tehran. I arrived in Tehran in September of 1979, and left December 22, 1980, so I was there between 15 and 16 months.
Nader had left for Iran in November the year before, and became very involved in the revolution there. He started a newspaper that year with some colleagues of his from CBS called Tehran Times, which is still being published, although he's no longer involved with it. I believe it became sort of a mouth piece of the government.
I came to be in Iran because Nader came to New York in the summer of 1979 and convinced me to go back with him. He secured jobs for us as stringers at NBC. In case you don't know, stringers are usually 1 or 2 man crews that work for the networks when news is light. He did camera, and I did sound. I went because a) the job b) Nader, whom I was in love with, but we had a complicated relationship c) I have always been intrigued by Iran d) I wanted to see the 'revolution' up close.
Unfortunately our job was short lived, as the hostages were taken the first week of November. The American Media poured in and I became radicalized :-)Seriously. I had always been somewhat delusional regarding our television networks, that while they don't show the whole thing, they made an effort to tell the news. What I learned very quickly was this was not true. I discovered that the story is decided prior to any fact finding. I quickly became disillusioned.
It was a very difficult year. Money was scarce. People were nervous. There was a lot of anarchy in the true sense of the word and there was a lot of hope. The hope really started to dissipate in the spring and summer of 1980. The mullahs consolidated power. I remember Bani Sadr giving history lessons on tv: how the Russian Revolution was hijacked by the Bolsheviks. It was so obvious what he was trying to tell people, but he was also complicit from the beginning. The mullahs had supported his presidential bid.
I will never forget the moment when I walked up the hill to television (where I worked) and heard that the 'sister' had to go home and change her clothes. I had been working there already for many months, and the guard was very embarrassed as he knew me and we were friendly. I was wearing a scarf, but now I needed a long shirt that covered my rear end. I stamped down the hill in absolute fury and for some reason felt terribly humiliated. It was very hot that day too. It was summer, probably in August that policy was implemented. All women who worked in government buildings had to observe hejab - dress code.
Wow, that was really interesting. I have so many questions to ask now. You bring up something interesting. We tend to think of the revolution in Iran as an Islamic one, but the reality is that there were many different factions (including Communists) involved in the overthrow of the Shah. So you were in Iran as the revolution was "Islamifying." In addition to the hejab, what would you say was the most striking example of the change from secular rule to Islamic rule?
It was not an Islamic revolution but it had an Islamic leader in the tradition of Iran; a charismatic leader and that was Khomeni. He was a magnetic personality and many gravitated toward him. But yes, the 'people' did not give up their power to the mullahs all at once. It was a consolidation of power in areas the previous government had ruled, such as television and the secret police, and required additionally the formation of the Revolutionary Guards and other supportive and intimidating structures. Mullahs executed a lot of people that year. I met and interviewed Judge Khalkhali, also known as Judge Blood. Quite an experience.
Shortly after I arrived in Tehran, a woman in a tight skirt was walking down the street. At the time, Iranian women ( in Tehran) sort of amazed me because they were either wearing the black chador or a floral chador wrapped around the body, or they were dressed like Italian women: skin tight jeans, very sexy etc. Very few women dressed in the rather asexual style in loose skirts or pants favored by Americans at the time. So this woman in her skin tight skirt was not that unusual. A man ran up and grabbed her skirt from the hem and ripped it straight up in protest. But from several directions, men converged upon him and sort of roughed him up and reprimanded him, and more people flocked to the woman and covered her with their coats. The crowd faced him off with indignation. He was an individual against a wall of disapproval for his extreme and insulting action.
At that time, people would socialize outside the walls, families would enjoy outings and music would play from cassette players with even a little dancing in the street. My impression was that Iranians like to have a good time. There was also happiness at the success and peacefulness of the revolution. Iranian soldiers had not massacred the people. By the time I left over a year later, that was over. The war had started and the squeeze was on. People had already left during the revolution, and another wave left in the fall of 1980. It was clear where the country was going.
Many different factions (including Communists) involved in the overthrow of the Shah...
Yes, the Tudeh Party were the communists. The Fedayeen were the leftists. And the Mujahadeen were the Islamic Leftists, if you want to call them that. I went to a Mujahadeen rally in the winter of 1979/1980. It ended in tear gas and guards opened machine gun fire into the crowds. It was utter chaos. People flattened to the ground in an instant to avoid getting shot.
In addition to the hejab, what would you say was the most striking example of the change from secular rule to Islamic rule?
Please understand that when I went to Iran, it was a time of flux. The shah was gone. I heard a great deal about what life was like under the shah but did not experience it first hand. Many people had already left, and many Jews were fleeing Iran when I arrived. Many people and intellectuals who had been banned and tortured under the shah had returned. For example Reza Baraheni, whom I met and interviewed, had returned. He eventually left again. There was hope for a period of time that Iran be a place that would accommodate free and intellectual thought, there was hope for real change, land distribution and rights for the peasants.
The change toward an Islamic state was creeping and gradual. But of course, like with Nazi Germany, the writing was on the wall. Khomeini made his intentions very clear. But people were really in love with him. He inspired loyalty to the extreme. Even people who were not religious. If I had to say what the change was, it was in the growing presence of Revolutionary Guards. It was the way people who had started things, like the Tehran Times, eventually gave up and drifted away. 2 of the 5 founding members of that paper had left for France by the time I left. The war really changed things. There were long lines for bread, rice and sugar. Tehran was being attacked, and the nights were dominated by the terrifying sounds of anti-aircraft missiles and actual bombs. Every late afternoon the air raid sirens screamed, warning people to get home before dark. This was a good opportunity for the mullahs to really move in and dig deep.
You may find that things have changed in this country. There has been damage done to our constitution. This administration used the attacks from 9/11 to do some very insidious things. War is always useful for undermining any democratic process because fear is a great weapon for manipulating people.
What is the one thing that you miss most about Iran?
Before I answer, I want to point out to you that the biggest thing that happened in Iran since I left is that the population has tripled (or something like that).
I miss most its light and colors.
What are your favorite blogs/sites?
I read your blog and through yours have started reading SERENDIP. I read the CATO website sometimes. NPR, WNYC - Look at the Bush/Blair Love Duet, at http://www.atmo.se/zino.aspx?articleID=399 - it's very funny. I have too many interests, agricultural, apiary, avian and environmental... it gets overwhelming.
Thanks Marie... This was a great start to our interview series.
Monday, February 26, 2007
Naive, not stupid
From Keivan
I am not sure were I am going with this, but first let me thank you all for your interesting comments. I do feel that if you read all of the responses to my posting you guys all will get at least partial answers to your asked/non asked questions.
I am definitely not sorry for taking part in the revolution. A 16 year-old boy who was part of something so huge and amazing can’t take a lot to take a credit for anything.
I feel that I need to clarify a couple of things. A woman wrote: “ I am one of those Iranians who lost much because of the revolution. at times, I sit down and blame people like you (or my husband), who were young, and stupid, and didn't listen to your fathers”. Basically I am not sure how to answer this, but first let me tell you this I was definitely young, but not stupid. (I know that I wrote that I was young and stupid. Probably “naïve” is a better word than “stupid.” At the time I did feel that what I was part of was the right thing to do. I had a sense of social justice. I could not accept that 44,000 Americans were getting paid more than the rest of the country. It was obvious that there were people who were just stealing from the nation, just as there are now. We were also very concerned about human rights.
Almost the whole country was proud to be part of the 1979 revolution: whether they like to admit it now or not. Considering the situation now, you can say most of people were better off then than now. Looking at boys and girls who are the same age I was at the time of the revolution, I can easily say we had much better lives then than they have now.
I am not sorry to be part of the revolution at all. I would do it again under the same situation; you can call it stupid or what ever you want. My father was wrong to just use his personal (maybe historical) experiences to keep me from being part of a something that a lot of people in the world called it one of the most amazing events of the last century. I say that, but my father was also right. He was right for the wrong reasons.
I do think the direction of the revolution changed from the way we imagined it. That is why I would not forgive people for wasting our dreams building a society that is collapsing from corruption, drug abuse, and dishonesty. I see unjustness here everyday.
I am not going to get in to why the revolution changed, because there are 100’s of books that are still not able to describe all the factors. It is just unbelievable how people in power here can heep people is this miserable situation and still appear on TV/Radio as innocents to complain about the lack of this and the lack of that. Even the dumbest person/government should learn after 28 years how to govern.
Naj wrote: “But you see ... this time around, Iran wants peace, and America is sending more fighter carriers to the Persian gulf ... why IS America not leaving us to our own problems?” If Iran wants peace, then why are they playing a mouse and cat game with the international community? Iran should defend its rights, including the right to Nuclear Technology, but Iran should be more transparent, at least in its foreign affairs, because the International communities are not like you and me who can be shut-up by the Ahmadinejad government. There are many ways to get what you want. It looks like we Iranians use always the most difficult and least successful ways. This is how I feel about Iranians in Qom, Los Angeles, and Tehran. Sorry if I create more arguments for you guys. I am going away for a couple of weeks, so you’ll just have to argue by yourselves.
I am not sure were I am going with this, but first let me thank you all for your interesting comments. I do feel that if you read all of the responses to my posting you guys all will get at least partial answers to your asked/non asked questions.
I am definitely not sorry for taking part in the revolution. A 16 year-old boy who was part of something so huge and amazing can’t take a lot to take a credit for anything. I feel that I need to clarify a couple of things. A woman wrote: “ I am one of those Iranians who lost much because of the revolution. at times, I sit down and blame people like you (or my husband), who were young, and stupid, and didn't listen to your fathers”. Basically I am not sure how to answer this, but first let me tell you this I was definitely young, but not stupid. (I know that I wrote that I was young and stupid. Probably “naïve” is a better word than “stupid.” At the time I did feel that what I was part of was the right thing to do. I had a sense of social justice. I could not accept that 44,000 Americans were getting paid more than the rest of the country. It was obvious that there were people who were just stealing from the nation, just as there are now. We were also very concerned about human rights.
Almost the whole country was proud to be part of the 1979 revolution: whether they like to admit it now or not. Considering the situation now, you can say most of people were better off then than now. Looking at boys and girls who are the same age I was at the time of the revolution, I can easily say we had much better lives then than they have now.
I am not sorry to be part of the revolution at all. I would do it again under the same situation; you can call it stupid or what ever you want. My father was wrong to just use his personal (maybe historical) experiences to keep me from being part of a something that a lot of people in the world called it one of the most amazing events of the last century. I say that, but my father was also right. He was right for the wrong reasons.
I do think the direction of the revolution changed from the way we imagined it. That is why I would not forgive people for wasting our dreams building a society that is collapsing from corruption, drug abuse, and dishonesty. I see unjustness here everyday.
I am not going to get in to why the revolution changed, because there are 100’s of books that are still not able to describe all the factors. It is just unbelievable how people in power here can heep people is this miserable situation and still appear on TV/Radio as innocents to complain about the lack of this and the lack of that. Even the dumbest person/government should learn after 28 years how to govern.
Naj wrote: “But you see ... this time around, Iran wants peace, and America is sending more fighter carriers to the Persian gulf ... why IS America not leaving us to our own problems?” If Iran wants peace, then why are they playing a mouse and cat game with the international community? Iran should defend its rights, including the right to Nuclear Technology, but Iran should be more transparent, at least in its foreign affairs, because the International communities are not like you and me who can be shut-up by the Ahmadinejad government. There are many ways to get what you want. It looks like we Iranians use always the most difficult and least successful ways. This is how I feel about Iranians in Qom, Los Angeles, and Tehran. Sorry if I create more arguments for you guys. I am going away for a couple of weeks, so you’ll just have to argue by yourselves.
Sunday, February 11, 2007
Down with down withs
From Keivan...
Down with America
We got up at 4 in the morning; it was a dark and cold winter day. My older brother, who was most of the time sick of having me around, agreed to go together to Qom. It was one of the coldest winter mornings that I had ever felt. The winter of 1979 was one I would never forget.
The night before we had convinced our mother and older brother that we would be okay and that they should not worry. We were going to witness the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini in Qom, right after he got back from France.
My lovely dying father, who was in bed with lung cancer at the time, tried everything to stop us from going. In a very powerless voice tried to convince us not to go. He was telling us non-stop that this revolution would bring the country backwards and that we should never trust the Mullahs. He was definitely not a Shah lover, but he had this bad feeling about everything was happening. We did not listen. We left for Qom.
It was not far from my hometown to Qom. We got there around 6 in the morning. We knew that Khomeini would arrive much later. On the ugly streets of Qom, my brother and I yelled -- not for first time -- thousand of times ”Allah-o akbar, Khomeini rahbar, marg bar Amrika.” (God is Great, Khomeini is the leader, down with America)
I will never forget that day. I did see Khomeini, and I was really happy to take this big action to witness an historical day in Iran.
I was happy about the revolution. Now I am like millions of my fellow countrymen who, like me, as young men and women went to the streets to cheer on the revolution and to shout down with America, and who now feel betrayed and devastated. Will the young people yelling the same thing today learn from me? Will they be like me? Regretful? Homeless?
My father was right about all of this. We were young and we were stupid. Maybe we were right about the revolution, but we were wrong about its direction. We did not know what we were talking about, just as my father said. Things took a turn for the worst. Me being only almost 16, I was really excited for the first time. Like people today on the streets of Iran, I did said many times Down with America. And I am really sorry about that. Not because America has been such nice friend for Iran, not because I say down with America and I don’t mean the American people, but because it is just so wrong to call for the death of a nation, and I don’t care which nation it is. This is especially true if you want to improve your image or you are internationally isolated.
I totally agree with Esther about this horrible flag burring sh*t.
Iranians should feel very sad and ashamed. I cannot imagine waking up in an apartment in New York city or any other city and looking out of the window and hearing people singing Down with Iran. It would be really painful. I know that I could not take it, and I know for a fact that it would make me sick. Hearing Down with America here is making me sick and that is not just to support Esther because she is living here with me, but because she is right. I am really sick and tired to hear how Iranians always blame others for every misfortune.
Even so I blame the British. ;-)
Down with America
We got up at 4 in the morning; it was a dark and cold winter day. My older brother, who was most of the time sick of having me around, agreed to go together to Qom. It was one of the coldest winter mornings that I had ever felt. The winter of 1979 was one I would never forget.
The night before we had convinced our mother and older brother that we would be okay and that they should not worry. We were going to witness the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini in Qom, right after he got back from France.
My lovely dying father, who was in bed with lung cancer at the time, tried everything to stop us from going. In a very powerless voice tried to convince us not to go. He was telling us non-stop that this revolution would bring the country backwards and that we should never trust the Mullahs. He was definitely not a Shah lover, but he had this bad feeling about everything was happening. We did not listen. We left for Qom.
It was not far from my hometown to Qom. We got there around 6 in the morning. We knew that Khomeini would arrive much later. On the ugly streets of Qom, my brother and I yelled -- not for first time -- thousand of times ”Allah-o akbar, Khomeini rahbar, marg bar Amrika.” (God is Great, Khomeini is the leader, down with America)
I will never forget that day. I did see Khomeini, and I was really happy to take this big action to witness an historical day in Iran.
I was happy about the revolution. Now I am like millions of my fellow countrymen who, like me, as young men and women went to the streets to cheer on the revolution and to shout down with America, and who now feel betrayed and devastated. Will the young people yelling the same thing today learn from me? Will they be like me? Regretful? Homeless?
My father was right about all of this. We were young and we were stupid. Maybe we were right about the revolution, but we were wrong about its direction. We did not know what we were talking about, just as my father said. Things took a turn for the worst. Me being only almost 16, I was really excited for the first time. Like people today on the streets of Iran, I did said many times Down with America. And I am really sorry about that. Not because America has been such nice friend for Iran, not because I say down with America and I don’t mean the American people, but because it is just so wrong to call for the death of a nation, and I don’t care which nation it is. This is especially true if you want to improve your image or you are internationally isolated.
I totally agree with Esther about this horrible flag burring sh*t.
Iranians should feel very sad and ashamed. I cannot imagine waking up in an apartment in New York city or any other city and looking out of the window and hearing people singing Down with Iran. It would be really painful. I know that I could not take it, and I know for a fact that it would make me sick. Hearing Down with America here is making me sick and that is not just to support Esther because she is living here with me, but because she is right. I am really sick and tired to hear how Iranians always blame others for every misfortune.
Even so I blame the British. ;-)
Tuesday, August 02, 2005
Ch-ch-changes
It's countdown to a new president in Iran.
Last night Khatami gave an important speech that K found pretty exciting. "Everything he should have said 8 years ago, he is saying now." I hope to find a good translation soon. You can read Payvand's summary here: http://www.payvand.com/news/05/aug/1005.html.
Until then, here is K's summary:
I had a hard time following the speech. I'll just say that it was the most animated speech I have seen Khatami give and that it was interrupted several times by applause.
Last night Khatami gave an important speech that K found pretty exciting. "Everything he should have said 8 years ago, he is saying now." I hope to find a good translation soon. You can read Payvand's summary here: http://www.payvand.com/news/05/aug/1005.html.
Until then, here is K's summary:
Since the beginning of the revolution, there have been two Islams. One that embraces tolerance and diversity and guarantees freedom of worship for Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians, and one that uses the tools of terror to impose its will. There is the Islam of Al Q'aeda and the Taliban and of those who support the use of methods of terror. And there is the Islam that says: we do not have all the answers. It says, we have to use scholarship to examine our faith and modernize our faith.
…
No manager in my government has ever been more than 5 meters from prison.
…
The Middle East can prosper when there is a true dialogue among the different faiths. The Middle East can prosper when Muslims, Christians, and Jews have a meaningful conversation with one another.
(1 ½ hours of explanation and then: standing ovation… )
I had a hard time following the speech. I'll just say that it was the most animated speech I have seen Khatami give and that it was interrupted several times by applause.
Tuesday, February 01, 2005
It’s the 26th anniversary…
…of the revolution in Iran. Twenty-six years. The television is filled with revolutionary footage, which is interesting because the footage never shows men and women together, and I know they marched together, or uncovered women, and I know that most of the women marching were uncovered. The revolution-related soap operas portray Shah supporters as greedy, ridiculous, clueless, and, in many cases, Jewish. “I never watch the revolution serial,” a friend told me. “It’s always ridiculous.” Every revolution needs its photo, film, and history editors who assist in re-creating events that did not exactly happen, doesn’t it? Don’t trust history you learn in school or in the movie theaters is the lesson here.
Which reminds me, I read little paperback called The Revolutionists about America’s own revolutionists. It was like reading a manual for the Iraqi insurgents (who should, by now, realize how slim their support is among Iraqis themselves) with its stories of Samuel Adams and the Sons of Liberty whose main activities seemed to be inciting the British troops to violence and creating martyrs who could gain public sympathy.
It seems that public sympathy for the Iraqi-based insurgents is pretty god-damn slim. Millions turned out to vote despite the fact that their lives were credibly threatened and many were killed. Think of that the next time you consider sitting an election out because it is raining.
The Iraqis in Iran were, by reports, positive. They were excited to vote and photos in the newspapers here showed genuinely happy men and women casting their votes. In interviews with Iraqis here, they said that they wanted American troops to stay in Iraq. The Iranian government says that it wants the American troops to leave and shows nightly images of the dead and dying in Iraq along with text that says something like: “Democracy American Style,” the Iraqis in Iran want the troops to stay, and Iranians want the Americans to invade Iran.
“Look,” an Iranian tells me, “if Iran and America did not have something going on under the table, then why is Karzai in Iran? Why are our relationships with Afghanistan improving?”
The nightly news showed pictures of Karzai and Khatami signing an agreement to build a new highway between the two countries. “Oh, so now it will be even easier to smuggle drugs into Iran,” I commented.
“That’s what everyone is saying,” said K.
There is no sign of improvement in the official communications between America and Iran though. Seymour Hersh’s article about covert pentagon operations aimed at discovering hidden nuclear sites in Iran made the news all over the country. The day after I read his article in the New Yorker, I was at a gathering with some pretty influential Iranian businessmen who told me how happy they were that relations between our two countries were improving. “That’s not what I hear,” I responded. To which one responded: “Don’t read the news and don’t connect to the Internet and don’t listen to any official pronouncements.”
I laughed.
…of the revolution in Iran. Twenty-six years. The television is filled with revolutionary footage, which is interesting because the footage never shows men and women together, and I know they marched together, or uncovered women, and I know that most of the women marching were uncovered. The revolution-related soap operas portray Shah supporters as greedy, ridiculous, clueless, and, in many cases, Jewish. “I never watch the revolution serial,” a friend told me. “It’s always ridiculous.” Every revolution needs its photo, film, and history editors who assist in re-creating events that did not exactly happen, doesn’t it? Don’t trust history you learn in school or in the movie theaters is the lesson here.
Which reminds me, I read little paperback called The Revolutionists about America’s own revolutionists. It was like reading a manual for the Iraqi insurgents (who should, by now, realize how slim their support is among Iraqis themselves) with its stories of Samuel Adams and the Sons of Liberty whose main activities seemed to be inciting the British troops to violence and creating martyrs who could gain public sympathy.
It seems that public sympathy for the Iraqi-based insurgents is pretty god-damn slim. Millions turned out to vote despite the fact that their lives were credibly threatened and many were killed. Think of that the next time you consider sitting an election out because it is raining.
The Iraqis in Iran were, by reports, positive. They were excited to vote and photos in the newspapers here showed genuinely happy men and women casting their votes. In interviews with Iraqis here, they said that they wanted American troops to stay in Iraq. The Iranian government says that it wants the American troops to leave and shows nightly images of the dead and dying in Iraq along with text that says something like: “Democracy American Style,” the Iraqis in Iran want the troops to stay, and Iranians want the Americans to invade Iran.
“Look,” an Iranian tells me, “if Iran and America did not have something going on under the table, then why is Karzai in Iran? Why are our relationships with Afghanistan improving?”
The nightly news showed pictures of Karzai and Khatami signing an agreement to build a new highway between the two countries. “Oh, so now it will be even easier to smuggle drugs into Iran,” I commented.
“That’s what everyone is saying,” said K.
There is no sign of improvement in the official communications between America and Iran though. Seymour Hersh’s article about covert pentagon operations aimed at discovering hidden nuclear sites in Iran made the news all over the country. The day after I read his article in the New Yorker, I was at a gathering with some pretty influential Iranian businessmen who told me how happy they were that relations between our two countries were improving. “That’s not what I hear,” I responded. To which one responded: “Don’t read the news and don’t connect to the Internet and don’t listen to any official pronouncements.”
I laughed.
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